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Catherine Warner 
Flighty Subjects: Sovereignty, Shifting Cultivators, and 
the State in Darjeeling, 1830–1856
This paper focuses on the historical experiences 
of shifting cultivators who lived in the eastern 
Himalaya in the areas around Darjeeling, Eastern 
Nepal, and Southern Sikkim in the early 19th 
century. These groups played an important role 
in state-formation in the precolonial period, as 
regionally expansive states relied upon them 
for labor, military levies, and revenue. Shifting 
cultivators were organized under headmen 
who dispensed justice, collected taxes, and 
negotiated with the state on behalf of their 
clients. The author argues that such groups 
formed the basis of sovereignty on the frontier, 
where control over subjects was more significant 
than control over clearly demarcated territory. 
Patrons of labor were well-versed in political 
negotiations and dexterously managed the shift 
to East India Company rule in Darjeeling in 1835; 
however, the Company administrators changed 
the terms of governance, even as they drew upon 
the headmen’s services in accessing laborers. 
By positing the labor market as the appropriate 
means of securing labor, the Company officials 
denied the role of the state in accumulating 
labor power. In addition, colonial discourse fixed 
shifting cultivators as backwards and in need 
of protection, undermining their important 
contributions to state formation under the 
previous dispensation. By distancing itself from 
patron-client relationships as vital to state 
formation and discrediting these networks 
of labor organization in favor of market logic, 
the Company in theory moved the terms of 
sovereignty towards territory rather than 
people. 
Keywords: Darjeeling, borderlands, colonialism, history,  
shifting cultivation. 
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Introduction
In April of 1925, a Lepcha in Dikchu, Sikkim, told an 
anthropologist a story about the bat who evaded paying 
taxes. According to the storyteller, Chyope, in the past 
the birds had demanded revenue from a bat.1 “When 
Nun-bong-pono-ong-fo (the king of birds) demanded his 
tax, he [the bat] showed his teeth, and snarled, saying he 
was not a bird, but that he belonged to the family of rats 
(ka-lok) and would not pay any tax [to which birds were 
subject].” The rat king, hearing this, came to collect his 
due, but the bat flourished his wings and insisted that, as a 
bird, he was exempt from paying any tax on rats. The two 
kings held a council and decided to kill the bat for refus-
ing to pay any taxes. The next day, the bat casually hung 
from the eaves of a thatched roof and loudly proclaimed 
that although soon he would be killed, he had many bat 
relations working in the service of their own king who 
would seek revenge. Overhearing this and fearing the bat’s 
many supporters, the two kings fled. Chyope explained in 
conclusion: “So that is why the bat is free from all taxation. 
Everybody in the world pays some sort of revenue, even 
we human beings, but the bat is free and doesn’t. That is 
why he always hides in the day time, and flies at night” 
(Stocks 1975: 47-48).
Although the anthropologist, De Beauvoir-Stocks, record-
ed this story some decades after the events of the period 
I shall address—the East India Company’s annexation of 
Darjeeling from Sikkim in 1835 and the initial development 
of the colonial hill station through the 1850s—it evokes 
key historiographical questions regarding sovereignty and 
identity in the borderland. In the story, the kings, who 
collect taxes on the basis of shared identity, collaborate 
with one another to support their own authority vis-à-vis 
their respective subjects. Sovereignty, then, is depicted 
as exclusive and vested in the relationship between ruler 
and subject, one based on shared qualities—one is either 
a subject of bats or rats or birds. This view of kingship, 
interestingly, does not match the multi-ethnic model of 
the Namgyal rulers of Sikkim with which the Lepcha sto-
ryteller would have been most closely acquainted; rather, 
the story suggests that state authority (as encompassed in 
the right to collect taxes) rests with the heads of clans or 
ethnic groups. For the subjects, belonging to such a group 
meant protection from multiple, competing authorities, 
all of whom might claim taxes or forced labor, in return 
for subordination to a single ruler. Such patron-client 
relationships were crucial foundations for building state 
sovereignty in the pre-colonial dispensation and became 
key sites for colonial intervention in the initial period of 
Darjeeling’s development as a hill station.2
Following the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-1816, the East India 
Company assumed the right to adjudicate the border be-
tween Sikkim and Nepal, signaling its territorial ambitions 
in the eastern Himalaya (Aitchison 1862). In practice, the 
Company’s assumption of the right to arbitrate a spatially 
defined, exclusive border between the two states produced 
little change until disputes within Sikkim spilled over the 
border into Nepal in the 1820s. The Company’s attempts 
to insert boundaries between Sikkim, Nepal, and its own 
territory after Darjeeling’s annexation in 1835, depended 
upon its ability to understand—in order to shape—local 
hierarchies, systems encompassing not only patron-client 
relationships but also their attendant social and econom-
ic obligations. In this light, territorial disputes proved 
inseparable from disputes about sovereignty over people. 
As a colonial power, the East India Company was unable to 
create strong linkages with Indian society or create hege-
monic influence at the grassroots level (Yang 1989; Guha 
1997). Thus, even as the Company engaged patron-client 
networks to procure laborers for building the hill station, 
these unequal relationships could no longer be considered 
the basis for legitimate rule. The notion that sovereignty 
adhered to territory rather than to people became an es-
sential fiction for early 19th century colonial governance. 
My argument builds upon the work of scholars who have 
noted the colonial state’s territorialization of governance 
and move towards unitary, non-overlapping forms of 
sovereignty in contrast to the “divisible and negotia-
ble” forms of a pre-colonial dispensation (Jalal 1995: 14). 
Many scholars have also offered insights into the ways in 
which colonial rule was territorialized by creating geo-
graphical inequalities and then employing discourses that 
naturalized these inequalities. Such trends often meant 
that forested and mountainous spaces demarcated as 
‘indigenous’ became ruled as exceptional spaces in need 
of authoritarian forms of control, as colonial discourses 
defined indigenous people as less capable of participating 
in the new colonial dispensation than other colonized 
South Asians (Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Rai 2004; Shneider-
man 2010; Sharma 2011; Ludden 2012). In accordance with 
this changing notion of sovereignty, Company administra-
tors described their efforts to attract and maintain manual 
laborers for carrying provisions, clearing and preparing 
building sites, and constructing roads, as the creation of a 
labor market where none had existed. By positing the mar-
ket as the ideal and just system for appropriating labor, 
the EIC administrators discredited and contained existing 
patron-client relationships even as they utilized them to 
gain access to laborers. This move undermined the power 
of labor patrons with whom pre-colonial states had formed 
alliances to achieve a territorial presence in the frontier. 
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The colonial state would become the arbiter of territory 
and leave the control of labor to the ‘market,’ effectively 
reversing the terms, rather than practice, of sovereignty in 
the borderland.3
Shifting Cultivation, Territory and State in the Eastern 
Himalaya, c. 1650-1800
In the Eastern Himalaya and bordering tarai (plains) from 
the 17th to the early 19th centuries, communities of shift-
ing agriculturalists, including Lepcha, Limbu, and Mech 
peoples, were important partners in state formation—a 
dynamic often ignored in the standard colonial narrative 
of gazetteers written after the mid-19th century (Hunter 
1876: 18-19; O’Malley 1907: 19-25). Indeed, over the last 
several decades, scholars have illuminated the integral 
and enduring roles shifting cultivators played in regional 
state formation and trade networks, even late into the 
19th century, across the Indian subcontinent (Pouche-
padas 1995; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Pratap 2000). On the 
basis of conversations with Lepcha elders in Sikkim in 
the 1930s, ethnographer Geoffrey Gorer (1967) speculated 
that Lepchas had largely abandoned fixed agriculture in 
the 18th and 19th centuries and practiced more nomadic 
lifestyles in an attempt to remain free of enslavement and 
other abuses during frequent conflicts between regional, 
expansive kingdoms. Therefore, shifting cultivation should 
be understood as a historically specific strategy for main-
taining distance from as well as negotiating with the state 
rather than a relic from previous modes of production. 
Regional states based on monarchies with non-local gene-
alogies seem to have taken root in the eastern Himalaya 
from the 17th century. Saul Mullard’s recent work on 
Sikkimese state formation highlights the importance of the 
‘Lho Mon Gtsong gsum agreement’ of 1663, which brought 
into alliance the three major ethnic groups of Sikkim 
(the Lho pa/ Tibeto-Sikkimese, the Mon/ Lepcha, and the 
Gtsong/ Limbu). A number of chiefs or headmen of the 
three ethnic groups provided their signatures, agreeing 
to abolish “separate governments of Lho, Mon, or Gtsong.” 
The agreement encapsulated the signers’ intent to form 
a united government under the Namgyal lineage, and to 
oppose outside influences that might intrude and disturb 
the dharma (religious order) within the kingdom (Mullard 
2011: 140-146). The Namgyal Rajas, also known as ‘Chogyal’ 
(dharma raja or upholder of the sacred order), employed 
dharma and a unique legal code as a way to demarcate 
sovereignty over ethnic communities who resided in Sik-
kim as well as several neighboring states. Other scholars 
have noted that the extension of state space in the Eastern 
Himalaya was closely bound up with the spread of ‘high 
religion’ (namely Hinduism and Buddhism) and the re-defi-
nition of ethnic identities (English 1985; Ortner 1989). In 
the case of the Lepchas, those who adopted the symbols 
and rituals of Buddhism seem to have gained higher 
status and greater claims to local resources vis-à-vis their 
communities (Kilgour 1897). Similarly, the Hindupati Sen 
Kingdom of present-day eastern Nepal, also established in 
the mid-17th century, governed by emphasizing religious 
patronage and extra-territorial connections as Hindu rul-
ers over a primarily animistic population (Pradhan 1991; 
Krauskopff 2000).4 
While regional courtly lineages, such as the Namgyals and 
Sens, built state power by defining the boundaries of group 
identity among the subject population in the Eastern 
Himalaya, resistance to such rule might idealize horizontal 
bonds within ethnic groups to subvert the state. As James 
Scott (2009) has argued in a different context, one can 
interpret the defining and policing of communal identities 
as a state strategy spread across colonial and non-colonial 
states. Mullard, on the other hand, views ethnic groups as 
partners in state formation in his emphasis on the agency 
of Lepchas, Limbus, and Tibeto-Sikkimese in the Lho Mon 
Gtsong gsum agreement establishing Sikkim. Espousing a 
view closer to Scott’s, late 20th-century Lepcha activist A. 
R. Foning argues that this was a case of divide and rule. In 
his view, the Namgyal lineage authored the pact in order 
to engineer a political break between Lepchas and Limbus, 
who otherwise shared common origins and many cultural 
practices. Foning argues that Lepcha society never took 
on a hierarchical structure—only seniors were accorded 
special rank—and only the import of Tibetan feudalism 
created a distinction between elite and commoner Lep-
chas. The Lepchas had only consented to the installation 
of the Namgyal dynasty in 1642, Foning contends, to honor 
an older pact formed when a Lepcha senior “was coaxed 
into ceremoniously swearing eternal friendship of broth-
erhood with the Tibetans who were gradually infiltrating 
into [their] land” (1987: 8). Taken together, Mullard’s and 
Foning’s historical arguments about identity formation 
suggest that both the community and the state negotiated, 
and at times contested, the terms of belonging and identity 
as part of a dynamic social and political dispensation in the 
pre-colonial Himalaya. 
The kingdom of Gorkha expanded eastward in the late 
18th century and, after it dismantled the intervening Sen 
kingdoms, its frontier came to rest against that of the king-
dom of Sikkim. For several decades, the frontier between 
Gorkha and Sikkim remained contested, without much 
apparent anxiety to either side. When Francis Buchanan 
(later Hamilton), a physician and servant in the Bengal 
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Medical Service, constructed a history of the Eastern Hima-
laya and border tarai in the early 19th century at the behest 
of the Company, he expressed significant doubt about 
who controlled which areas. Indeed, an open frontier may 
have been desirable in a situation in which neither state 
had sufficient military power to police the border. In some 
places, Sikkim and Nepal seemed to have shared control 
of territory—for example, of Nagri fort near a frontier 
trade route (Hamilton (1819) 1971). Yet while two king-
doms might share territory, not so high-status subjects. In 
the late 18th century, as Gorkha expanded into the Pallo 
Kirat region of present-day eastern Nepal, a number of 
important local people fled to Sikkim. Gorkha king Prithvi 
Narayan Shah’s agents were deputed to offer Sikkim the 
choice of turning out the refugees or facing battle. Sikkim 
chose the former option (Vajracharya and Shrestha 1978). 
Thus, both states vied for exclusive access to networks of 
local patron-client networks, in the majority Limbu region, 
as a way of asserting their local influence over trade routes 
and hill products and resources.
Patron-Client Relationships among Shifting 
Agriculturalists 
The frontier areas of western and southern Sikkim and 
eastern Nepal (an area encompassing present-day Dar-
jeeling), in the early 19th century, were largely populated 
by groups of shifting agriculturalists allied with region-
al states. These alliances, apparently reaching back to 
the consolidation of regional states in the 17th century, 
formed around powerful men who could mobilize labor 
and impose a tax on agrarian surplus. An agreement 
between the Sen kings (the regional rulers preceding 
Gorkha expansion) and the Kirats (of present-day eastern 
Nepal) stipulated that the Kirat headmen must keep lists of 
tax-payers, and maintain watch over who entered and left 
their areas of jurisdiction. Headmen were also responsible 
for producing stipulated numbers of trained warriors on 
demand (Naraharinath 1966: 92-95). Mullard’s work sup-
ports the notion that regional states were keeping written 
records of tax obligations to some degree in the 17th cen-
tury; Mullard has translated a fragment listing Sikkimese 
subjects of various ethnicities (primarily Lepcha and Lim-
bu) contained in a Tibetan manuscript compiled from 1645 
to 1676, or a few decades after the Namgyal establishment. 
Later documents resembling this list found in the Sikkim 
archive are explicitly labeled tax lists (Mullard 2011). That 
censuses were taken by the regional states for the purpos-
es of taxation also seems to be borne out by the experience 
of the colonial census takers in Darjeeling District in 1871: 
a number of locals fled across the border into Nepal to  
avoid being counted because they feared enumeration and 
taxation went hand-in-hand (Baines 1892). 
Given the scarcity of labor, local social norms were neces-
sarily incorporative. Limbu activist and scholar Iman Singh 
Chemjong’s translation of codes pertaining to communi-
ty adoptions suggests that incorporating new members 
into the group was significant for defining Limbu cultural 
practice. Adoptions would take place during an assembly 
of representatives of the ten chiefs of the districts, a cere-
mony that included the adopter and adoptee. According to 
his translation, the priest would remind the assembly that 
this was an old tradition sanctioned by the wisdom of their 
forefathers who had promoted population growth as a col-
lective good. He would also remind them of the words of 
the forefathers: “If any member of any other nationality or 
race or tribe or family or cast or creed desires to join your 
family, let him be accepted among your children as mem-
bers of the same fold.” The ceremony ended by declaring 
that the adoptee “no longer belong[ed] to [his] old caste or 
race or tribe.” The assembly would record the decision in 
a written agreement with all present signing as witnesses, 
subject to a set fine if any among them should go on to 
speak badly of the adopted person (Chemjong 2003: 60-62). 
Thus, group sanction ensured acceptance of new members.
More details about the organization of shifting cultivators 
emerge from colonial administrators’ observations about 
Mech and Dhimal groups located in the low foothills to the 
southwest of Darjeeling and Lepchas in the hills around the 
new station from the late 1830s. These groups paid reve-
nue and provided free labor to Sikkim, which claimed them 
as its subjects. Rather than living in condensed villages, 
families were spread out across a loosely defined jungle 
area, partially clearing land for cultivation through cutting 
and burning and moving on after three years. Sikkim’s 
tax structure encouraged such movement with increased 
rates imposed after the third year. Shifting cultivators 
also gained leverage with the state authorities to whom 
they paid taxes by holding out the threat of relocating to 
a neighboring sovereign’s area. Each cultivator paid a tax 
determined by his number of tools to a headman who was 
acknowledged to have first found and settled the clients in 
the area.5 As a Mandal heading a group of Mech and Dhimal 
cultivators asserted in the mid-19th century, Mandals “get 
followers and Ryots when ever [sic] they can, they bring 
them from other countries to their own, and in whatever 
part of the country between the Mechi and the Teesta 
[Rivers] the person so brought may reside. The Meches 
recognise no territorial division among the Chowdrys. It 
is the Ryots [sic] that are divided…” The Mandals acted as 
the headmen of a group of tax-paying shifting cultivators, 
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provided some judicial authority, and handed the taxes 
over to a Chaudhari, or regional revenue official, who then 
conveyed the payments to Sikkim.6 
Lepchas were also organized under headmen, but in con-
trast with the Mech of the lower hills, were more closely 
integrated into Sikkim’s military service structure. Many 
Lepcha headmen owed armed service to Sikkim while 
others owed service and tax to Buddhist Lamas. Anthro-
pologist Lionel Caplan argued that the customary rights 
of “first settlers” formed the basis of the kipat (communal 
system of land tenure) in the Limbu region of eastern 
Nepal (1970). The ways in which Mandals gathered and 
settled raiyats (subjects), possibly by force, in the region 
suggest that the rights of first settlement were in part 
established by the regulation of shifting cultivation and 
allowed the Mandals stronger claims to land than their 
clients. In the hills, the Lepchas grew dry rice and maize 
without use of the plough. Mech agriculture followed the 
same pattern but also included cotton, which cultivators 
marketed in local bazaars. Like the Kirats in the late 18th 
century, as discussed above, group membership depended 
on patronage, organization of shifting agriculture as pro-
ducing an (at least marginal) economic surplus, and a loose 
relationship with geography, rather than strictly defined 
ethnic or territorial sovereignty (The Dorjeeling Guide 1845; 
Hooker 1854; Gorer 1967; Pinn 1986).7
Patterns of shifting cultivation were structured by obli-
gations of forced labor, including personally attending or 
guarding a person of rank, carrying supplies, and domestic 
or agricultural labor owed to headmen and the Sikkim 
Raja. As the East India Company annexed Darjeeling in 
1835 and moved into the region, the balance of authority 
seems to have tilted towards the Chaudharis. For example, 
the Mech Chaudharis in the foothills continued to collect 
unlimited begar (forced labor), even as they helped their 
clients to negotiate an increased revenue payment in re-
turn for excused labor obligations to Sikkim. Substituting 
cash payments for forced labor indicates a move towards 
equating labor with a particular and definable value. The 
Mech people were accustomed to trading their agricul-
tural and forest products, especially cotton, in the mar-
kets located in their own forests as well as in Darjeeling.8 
Increased market linkages helped the shifting agricultural-
ists to negotiate their relationship with the regional state 
(especially the labor obligation) through access to cash. 
Indeed, cash commutation for labor taxes was not limited 
to Sikkim; in the late 18th century the Gorkhas introduced 
a new set fee in eastern Nepal for Limbus to pay in 
substitution of forced labor. The practice of optional cash 
commutation spread to the rest of Nepal by the early 19th 
century (Sagant 2003). 
Shifting Cultivators and Clients Talk to the Company
During the Anglo-Nepal War between the East India 
Company and the Gorkha state (1814-1816), the Company 
wanted to curtail Gorkha expansion to the east but lacked 
the military manpower to do so. Instead, Captain Latter 
(stationed with troops in Purnia) provided Sikkim with 
limited weapons and the assurance that if their armed 
forces could overthrow the Gorkhas in their territory, 
the Company would support them after the war (Papers 
Respecting the Nepaul War 1822). Lepcha and Limbu officers 
and soldiers revolted against the Gorkha outposts, and the 
Company penned a treaty fixing the territorial gains. The 
Company then effected a separate non-treaty agreement 
with Sikkim transferring the tarai region to the royal lin-
eage and heirs “in consideration of the services performed 
by the Hill tribes under the control of the Raja of Sikkim” 
(Aitchison 1862: 143). Thus, while the crucial role of the 
“Hill tribes” in effecting the military victory is acknowl-
edged, the spoils went to the monarchy. This treaty can be 
read as a first step in the Company’s efforts to reduce the 
influence of groups of shifting cultivators in the region, in 
favor of engaging unilaterally with Sikkim’s monarchy. 
The East India Company justified its claim to the Darjeeling 
area by factitiously arguing that only under its influence 
could the local population co-exist peacefully and then 
seized upon the occasion of a border dispute to expand 
into the region. In 1826, the Lepcha Prime Minister, Chag-
zot Bolot (also known as Buljeet) was murdered by a court 
faction as Tshudpud Namgyal (r. 1793-1863) attempted to 
reassert his lineage’s authority and overturn the puppet 
status to which the Lepcha ‘Bar phung clan had subjugated 
him. The Prime Minister had supposedly taken the king’s 
red seal and misappropriated the revenue, both under-
stood as treasonous acts. This was not a simple Lepcha ver-
sus Tibeto-Sikkimese power struggle, as by this time the 
royal and ministerial families had become linked through 
marriage—Bolot was the uncle through his wife to Chogyal 
Tshudpud Namgyal. Bolot’s nephews fled to Ilam (Nepal), 
part of their patrimonial estate, taking about 800 Lepcha 
households from Chidan and Namthang (Sprigg 1995; Mull-
ard 2010). Apparently, Colonel Lloyd, the Company’s inter-
mediary with Sikkim, had encouraged the Lepcha faction 
to leave Sikkim, as he thought it would simplify political 
affairs in the country. The Lepcha refugees, protected by 
Nepal, were based near Ilam on a hill called Onto situated 
between the headwaters of the Mechi river, but Jerung 
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Kazi requested the Agent for the North-Eastern Frontier 
Colonel Lloyd’s permission to return to his patrimonial 
estate around Darjeeling (O’Malley 1907). Moreover, the 
refugee Kazis claimed that Lloyd had encouraged their 
exodus from Sikkim and as such he owed them some land 
in compensation. Sikkim and Nepal’s dispute over posses-
sion of Onto, then, was as much about jurisdiction over 
people as territory, yet nevertheless fell within the treaty’s 
stipulations of Company arbitration. Archibald Campbell 
of the Nepal Residency, Colonel Lloyd, and the Commercial 
Agent from Malda, G.W. Grant, mediated the initial border 
mission. Grant and Lloyd noticed Darjeeling’s favorable 
landscape and exhorted the Governor-General to negotiate 
with Sikkim for the territory whenever possible in order to 
create a sanitarium in the eastern Himalaya accessible to 
the Bengal Presidency. In the winter of 1834-1835, Sikkim 
accused the Lepcha refugees in Nepal of intruding into the 
Sikkim Morang, leading to fresh border disputes. Colonel 
Lloyd returned to the region and used this opportunity to 
secure the succession of Darjeeling in return for repulsing 
the refugees.9 
At this time, the border dispute was still unsettled, as the 
Mechi River had been designated the accepted border 
between Nepal and Sikkim in the treaty of 1817 without, 
however, designating exactly where this river originated. 
The Company deposed deputies for Sikkim and Nepal to 
settle the border for the last time in 1838 (several years 
after the annexation of Darjeeling) from which a number 
of transcripts survive.10 From this series of depositions and 
commentary, we gain a sense of the way territorial control 
was structured around patron-client relationships as well 
as a hint of the perspective of the clients (the ‘bats’ in the 
Lepcha folktale). The Lepchas controlled the area on the 
ground, but many of the men interviewed had worked in 
various capacities as local functionaries (even as shikhari, 
or huntsman) for Nepal, Sikkim, and Lepcha Kazis, who 
were semi-independent of Sikkim at different times. Lim-
bus, Lepchas, and some migrants from the mid-western 
Nepal hills had previously cultivated the area, and it had 
recently been connected by road (constructed through the 
use of local forced labor) from Ilam to Nagri and towards 
the Mechi River but not yet up to the Company frontier. It 
seems that following the war, Sikkim had captured and re-
located Onto’s shifting cultivators within its own territory. 
Later, a number of them had returned to Nepal. 
In the depositions from the border settlement of 1838, 
when questioned about the impetus behind their patterns 
of movement between Sikkim and Nepal, the clients pro-
vided conflicting testimony. Ajuk (known to other Lepchas 
as ‘Adhikari’ or ‘Secretary’), formerly acted as an orderly 
for Chatrajit, also known as Chutup, Lepcha leader of the 
Sikkimese forces.11 Ajuk claimed that he was taken by force 
from his home near Ilam by Sikkim troops and relocat-
ed to Chongtong in Sikkim after the Anglo-Nepal war of 
1814-1816.12 When asked by the Company translator if he 
was “taken by force or with his [own] consent,” he replied 
that he was taken “by force.” However, when questioned 
how long he remained in Sikkim and whether he had been 
free to leave, he replied that he remained for “six or seven 
years…of [his] own freewill.”
Humsbarra, a 47-year-old Limbu, responded to the bound-
ary agents’ questions by explaining in greater detail the 
capture of local people by armed Lepchas from Sikkim 
after Jaintia Khatri, the Gorkha Subah (commander) posted 
at Nagri, had been forced to retreat to Nepal following the 
war. Humsbarra said that the “Sikkim people” came and 
“carried away Elam Sing and Eknaggree and many Lepchas 
and Limboos.” Upon further questioning, he stated: “They 
took all the Lepchas. The Limboos fled to Phakphoi west-
ward.” When asked for names, Humsbarra mentioned “Aka 
Limboo. Eknaggree and gooling Soobeeas. Debria Jimpan. 
Lupchas [sic]. And others.” The examiner asked Humsbarra 
to verify Ajuk’s story (noted above) that he was captured 
and taken by the Sikkimese party. Humsbarra clarified: 
“They carried away his Chief, he [Ajuk] hid himself at the 
time and followed them afterwards.” Clearly, there was a 
different understanding of ethnic or corporate identity in 
which Lepcha and Limbu identities overlap, even if some 
distinction was understood by local people.13 
Testimonies contained in the report of 1838 also indicate 
that revenue obligations could cross state boundaries. 
Kookah, a 75-year-old Lepcha, reiterated that after the 
war “[s]ome soldiers from Sikim [sic] came and took away 
the [military/civil officers] and carried them across the 
Rumbong river to Nagree.” He said that he too was taken, 
as well as his Chief. Kookah remained in the area across 
the Rumbong River in Sikkim and cultivated for one year, 
after which he returned to his place of origin, Siddileang 
[Nepal]. His Chief, Gooling Jumpun [Dzongpon?], settled at 
Chongtong in Sikkim. After returning to Siddileang, Koo-
kah continued to pay revenue intermittently to his chief 
at Chongtong (although they were technically under two 
different states). He stated that he used to go to Chongtong 
and take the chief things, “[s]ome as Nuzzur some as rev-
enue.” This statement suggests that a degree of voluntary 
action and reciprocity existed in this relationship, as nazar 
would have been a gift, perhaps for protection, which Koo-
kah made according to his own means and needs, whereas 
revenue would have indicated a more bureaucratic and 
fixed demand. Kookah further stated that in this manner, 
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he paid revenue for two years to Gooling Jumpun and then 
he did not pay anyone for two years—a statement which 
further underscores Kookah’s relative autonomy vis-à-vis 
his chief.
These testimonies taken from the boundary commission 
reveal that Nepal was still working to insert itself into 
the local political economy around Ilam (formerly subject 
to the defunct Sen kingdom) in the early 19th century. 
Further, the eastern boundaries of Nepal and Sikkim 
overlapped, with each state having promoted the settle-
ment of subjects within the same territory. At the same 
time, Lepchas clearly held the balance of power in the 
area, as the Nepali subjects had to leave when the Lepchas 
‘revolt[ed]’ during the war of 1814-1816 (Aitchison 1862: 
149-152; The Dorjeeling Guide 1845: 66). Sri Kishan Gharti 
Havildar, of Ilam gadhi (fort) in Nepal, stated that his older 
brother had been deputed by Nepal to settle people in 
the Khoegurry ridge at the time when Jaintia Khatri was 
Subah. The settlers would not pay revenue for five years, 
after which time they were to pay their revenues to the 
Gorkha company stationed at Nagri. The brother of the 
havildar (low-ranking officer) brought raiyats, including 20 
families of his caste, as well as his own family from Majh 
Kirat. They had to depart the area after one year, howev-
er, because the war broke out, followed by ‘the revolt of 
the Lepchas.’ When Nepal allowed the settlement of the 
Lepcha refugees near Ilam some 20 years later, they too 
were to pay their revenues to the military outpost, and the 
appointed jagirdar (land grantee) was exhorted to settle 
more raiyats from ‘Bhot’ and ‘Muglan’ in the area (Vajra-
charya and Shrestha 1978). 
These examples reveal an intricate sense of service and pa-
tronage encompassing both free and unfree forms of labor, 
and spanning state boundaries. Moreover, these testimo-
nies indicate that the ability of actors within patron-cli-
ent relationships to constitute and effectively negotiate 
extra-territorial networks underscored their shifting and 
relative power vis-à-vis one another. The hegemony of 
the intermediaries locally is highlighted by the tendency 
in the depositions for calendric time to be reckoned by 
the tenure of such intermediaries rather than the reign 
of regional monarchs. For example, many deponents 
refer to ‘the time of Jaintia Khatri’ (the Gorkha Subbah or 
commander) or ‘the time of Yukunda Kazi’ (a Lepcha chief 
who paid revenue to Jaintia Khatri) to situate past events. 
State extension was made possible through personal ties 
of patronage in which intermediaries accepted allegiance 
to one of the states, but the majority of shifting cultivators 
maintained no direct ties with the regional state, so their 
status as state subjects remained ambiguous. For example, 
while Ajuk initially hid from the Sikkimese soldiers, he 
later felt compelled to follow his patron. Perhaps because 
the Sikkimese understood this degree of obligation in the 
relationship, they only took the more important men, the 
military officers. While the relationship between subject 
and chief seems in some ways as one of total dependency, 
which Chatterjee and Eaton (2006) have defined as slavery 
in the South Asian context, there was also an apparent de-
gree of latitude. Kookah only intermittently offered pres-
ents to his chief and after two years seems to have stopped 
altogether, despite the relationship of dependency re-
maining socially acknowledged. The folktale about the bat 
and the rat and bird kings cited above offers some sense 
of the calculations upon which clients may have relied to 
gauge their current or former patron’s political standing 
and thus his ability to enforce payments or, alternately, 
positively intervene on behalf of the clients within larger 
networks. Indeed, Superintendent of Darjeeling Campbell 
explained the frequent visits of the Kazi’s representatives 
from Ilam (in eastern Nepal) in the late 1830s and early 
1840s as important for the Kazis, not only in negotiating 
their relationship with the governors of the new hill sta-
tion but also, and equally so, in convincing their clients of 
their enduring political influence, despite recent changes.14 
The fluidity and reshaping of such networks is captured 
well by a group of Lepcha shifting cultivators near Dar-
jeeling who claimed that they paid revenue ‘to anyone’ 
when questioned by the new colonial authorities in 1839. 
Patron-client networks remained essential for the shifting 
cultivators of the eastern Himalaya as they faced political 
changes concomitant with the colonial encroachment.
Colonial Intervention: Separating Shifting Cultivators 
from the State 
Company officials also took advantage of networks of pa-
tronage to build infrastructure and provide services in the 
new hill station. In 1838, shortly after annexation, Colonel 
Lloyd counted 21 Lepcha ‘families’ settled close by the 
hill station, totaling 51 males and 37 females. About half 
of them paid revenue to the Sikkim Raja, the other half to 
an unnamed ‘head Lama.’15 Until the plantation economy 
reconfigured the landscape in the 1860s, land revenue was 
collected on an ad hoc basis, which the first official settle-
ment of 1850 simply maintained. Collections were funneled 
through the old patron-client system and resembled more 
closely “the superintendence of a private estate than 
the collection of Government revenue” (Jackson 1854: 
11). Darjeeling’s first official Superintendent, Campbell, 
attempted to gain the favor of various Lepcha Kazis, Mech 
Chaudharis, and other labor patrons, drawing in part 
upon his initial encounter with local notables near Onto 
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in 1838 (Campbell 1869). For example, Campbell sent gifts 
to the Tibeto-Sikkimese Kazi of Bhadaong, who controlled 
a tract straddling the Tista River; in return, the Kazi sent 
craftsmen to Darjeeling. For this favor, Campbell spent 
about Rs.42 to buy presents as well as a gun, as requested. 
In this case as in others, initially the supply of workmen 
seems to have benefitted the patron rather than the work-
ers.16 Campbell openly admitted that he drew upon such 
cross-border ties to attract almost 2,000 laborers to Dar-
jeeling in the initial years after annexation. He explained 
to his superiors:
Formerly, the resort of Nipalese [sic] to Darjeeling 
for service or trade was discountenanced, if not 
altogether prohibited, by the authorities at Ilam. 
Now…the people are encouraged to resort hither 
for the purposes of trade and servitude and the same 
is pointed to by their rulers as an honorable and easy 
method of obtaining money for the payment of their rents 
a mode preferred at Ilam to the usage of doing so 
in grain, cattle or labor as they were wont from im-
possibility of concerting the produce of their labor, 
or their labor itself into Cash.17
In other words, Campbell drew upon the needs of patrons, 
especially their desire for cash, rather than the interests of 
their subjects in order to obtain manual laborers. 
While Campbell insisted in his correspondence with the 
Government of Bengal that he was creating a local labor 
market to supply the station’s needs, the political nature of 
the networks was all too obvious to his Company superi-
ors. Government expressed appreciation that Campbell 
had settled the Lepcha refugees from Nepal in Darjeeling, 
as well as some Mech shifting cultivators formerly sub-
ject to Sikkim, but cautioned Campbell against inviting 
groups from neighboring countries because it might lead 
to political conflict.18 On the one hand, Sikkim repeatedly 
called for its subjects who had settled in Company-con-
trolled Darjeeling to be returned. On the other hand, a 
number of local intermediaries realized the potential for 
vastly expanding their own influence if they could corner a 
monopoly on settling people around Darjeeling.19 Thus, for 
example, Jerung Kazi petitioned Colonel Lloyd in 1839 to 
allow him to bring his dependents from Ilam and to “be re-
stored to the situation of collecting the revenues, manag-
ing the country in the hills and Morung, and exercising the 
office of the Dewan as held by [his] uncle Buljeet” (quoted 
in Pinn 1986: 171). Jerung Kazi apparently viewed the 
exchange of the labor power of his dependents as meriting 
an official position.20 
Campbell built the hill station through developing long-
term relationships with intermediaries who controlled 
dependents, rather than developing a labor market as he 
claimed; yet, he refused to accord bureaucratic position 
to the intermediaries who supplied him with labor. Chebu 
Lama became one of Campbell’s closest Lepcha associates, 
one who mediated Company-Sikkim diplomacy initially as 
vakil (diplomatic agent) for the latter and later in a more 
private capacity for the former. In return for his loyalty, 
Campbell granted him a tract near Darjeeling in 1850.21 
Nevertheless, the Superintendent patronizingly regarded 
Chebu Lama as a sort of pet informant who, he asserted, 
displayed the extent of “mental and moral development 
attainable by a Lepcha—namely, through European influ-
ence and guidance” (Campbell 1869: 153). While Chebu 
Lama filled the role of a Lepcha native informant, his 
mother was a Lepcha and his father a ‘Bhotia’ (Tibeto-Sik-
kimese), as Campbell acknowledges (Campbell 1869). Since 
descent was often determined by the father’s side of the 
family (thus the Namgyals could marry Limbu and Lepcha 
wives, for example, without producing Limbu or Lepcha 
children), and Chebu Lama’s father was not, as mentioned, 
a Lepcha, he probably retained the option of identifying 
with Tibeto-Sikkimese circles (Hooker 1854; Risley 1894). 
In fact, this pedigree may have helped Chebu Lama remain 
influential in a court setting in which Lepcha factions 
had so recently been expelled from favor. Whereas Chebu 
Lama had worked as vakil to Sikkim, he had to negotiate 
with the Company on the basis of his indigenous status. As 
indicated by the language of the treaty between the East 
India Company and Sikkim which set the state for Com-
pany influence, ‘Hill tribes’ would no longer be accorded 
political status in subsequent negotiations. Thus, Chebu 
Lama gained land and wealth, but undermined his own 
claims to state authority in the new colonial dispensation 
by emphasizing his Lepcha rather than Tibeto-Sikkimese 
background (Hooker 1854; Aitchison 1862). 
That local patrons of labor came to understand the terms 
upon which they were to engage the Company—as indige-
nous representatives rather than state officials—is further 
highlighted in a petition from a group of Mech shifting 
cultivators conveyed by Superintendent Campbell to the 
Government of Bengal in 1850. At the time, a Company mil-
itary contingent had occupied the Sikkim Morang (plains) 
following a dispute with Sikkim enflamed by Campbell’s 
unexpected arrest and detention while visiting Sikkim in 
the fall of 1849.22 The disagreement between the two states 
largely arose because Sikkim claimed that the Company’s 
administration in Darjeeling was taking its subjects and 
obstructing its trade, thus eating into its revenue base. In 
response, Campbell declared Sikkim’s subjects to be slaves 
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who preferred the so-called free market in Darjeeling. 
Campbell’s labor market clearly resembled the pre-existing 
patron-client relationships far more than he admitted: as 
he tried to find manual laborers for porterage and jungle 
clearing for his military campaign, he called on local “eth-
nic” leaders, to whom he had given the right to settle shift-
ing cultivators in the new territory, to provide conscripts. 
His claim to forced labor in return for his recognition of 
the headmen’s position directly paralleled the previous 
dispensation he claimed to have overturned.23
In the petition, penned while his home territory (the 
Sikkim Morang) was under military occupation, Bir Singh 
Chaudhari leaves out the immediate political context, as 
well as his own negotiations with Company representa-
tives stretching over several decades from the time of the 
original border surveys. Indeed, the first acting supervisor 
of the station, Lloyd, had appointed Bir Singh in 1838 to 
collect taxes from the Mech and Dhimals in the Company’s 
new territory and to collect a transit duty on merchan-
dise entering and leaving the station, even before the 
Government had approved such a measure. Moreover, his 
residence near the road built from Titalya (now in Bangla-
desh) to Darjeeling in the early 1840s ensured contact with 
European travelers who expected him to provide laborers 
for carrying baggage. Yet, the area of the Morang in which 
he, as well as the cultivators, resided, was contested by 
Nepal, Sikkim, and increasingly the Company (as its only 
approach to the hill station from Bengal was via Sikkim’s 
plains). Perhaps to escape such conflicting demands, he 
somewhat successfully petitioned the Company in the 
1830s to allow him to become its subject rather than that 
of Sikkim, although the latter did not recognize this dis-
tinction.24
Bir Singh’s first petition, co-authored with twenty Man-
dals (headmen) who apparently worked under him, is 
couched in oddly ethnographic rather than political terms. 
The petition begins with the line: “The following are our 
customs and habits” and goes on to argue that the Mech 
homeland is different because of the organization of shift-
ing cultivators there. This formulation likely comes from 
his close association with Campbell, who admitted to his 
superiors that “the petition [was] in some degree personal 
to [himself].”25 Further, Campbell had previously collected 
ethnographic data from Bir Singh’s clients to study and 
write about the Mech people. The petition suggests that 
Bir Singh understood Campbell’s ethnographic interest 
as integral to the latter’s official duties (rather than as a 
hobby as Campbell likely regarded it). Bir Singh argued 
that his people could not be attached to Purnia because 
they could not adapt to traveling outside of the jungle to 
attend court and engage with the government there. The 
distinction between living in Purnia, a district of Bengal, 
and Darjeeling, a non-regulation district in which Bengal’s 
legal system was mediated by the paternalistic authority of 
the Superintendent, was not lost on Bir Singh. The Chaud-
hari clearly would benefit from joining Darjeeling, where 
his status as patron to about 200 Mech cultivators would 
be recognized and rewarded, yet he framed his petition by 
arguing that as an indigenous group, they needed protec-
tion. Moreover, Bir Singh seems to have been engaged in 
a long-standing dispute with neighbors in Purnia, who he 
feared would involve him in court cases there. He con-
cludes his second petition by once again downplaying 
political considerations:
If we are made over to the Purneah authorities we 
shall have no one to understand our affairs, and 
cases, as our languages are quite unknown there, 
and we know not the languages used there. We 
are poor people, and are not in any way rebellious. 
Purneah and Darjeeling are both in the British 
dominions, but we hope that we may be placed 
under Darjeeling, so that our lands and homes may 
remain to us under your protecting Rule.26 
Thus he claims the need for protection because he and his 
people were “ignorant of the manner in which the business 
of the Courts is transacted in the Company’s territories,” 
whereas he seems actually quite aware of the implications 
of attachment to Purnia.27 Like Chebu Lama and various 
Lepcha Kazis, Bir Singh found it expedient to negotiate 
with the Company as an indigenous representative who 
could mediate on behalf of a supposedly backwards group, 
because he realized this was an effective language to em-
ploy with the Company representatives.
Bir Singh’s Victory and a Conclusion
Bir Singh Chaudhari’s calculations may seem shortsight-
ed, as the indigenous people around Darjeeling would be 
steamrolled by the spread of tea plantations from 1856. 
Yet, if we set aside our present-day knowledge of dispos-
session and marginalization by the colonial plantation 
economy in Darjeeing in the latter half of the 19th century, 
we might better appreciate Bir Singh’s efforts as he, in 
fact, got his way. As of February 1850, the Company had 
decided to annex the entire Sikkim Morang to Purnia, in 
accordance with the idea that hills and plains should be 
administered separately. A month later, after a number of 
shifting cultivators had fled to Nepal, the Government of 
Bengal reversed the decision—the lower foothills around 
Pankhabari in which the Mech resided would be annexed 
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to Darjeeling instead of Purnia. The Secretary to the Board 
of Revenue even warned local authorities that Purnia’s es-
tablishment should have little contact with the Mech since 
they would be attached to Darjeeling, but that “whenev-
er occasion for communication may arise, the Purneah 
Authorities should be as considerate and conciliating as 
possible in their dealings with them, for the accounts show 
that they are such a timid and ignorant people, a trifling 
misunderstanding might cause them to abscond into Nipal 
or Bootan.” Threats of desertion worked, yet the terms 
upon which Bir Singh Chaudhari and the Mech Mandals 
achieved temporary victory (as a “timid and ignorant 
people” when this was far from the case), would aid the 
Company in undermining the rights of shifting cultivators 
in the new dispensation ushered in with the spread of tea 
plantations just a half dozen years later.28
In conclusion, let us revisit the folktale about the renegade 
bat. In the story, it is the bat who wields power over the 
rather ridiculous and vulnerable figures of the rat king 
and the bird king. They are quick to threaten violence, 
but end up running away when the bat outwits them by 
playing with the boundaries of identity. By the 1850s, this 
strategy was waning in effectiveness. With the extension 
of colonial rule, there were few such figures left who could 
operate outside state control by negotiating the fuzzy 
areas between corporate identities and mobilizing per-
sonal relationships for support. While shifting cultivation 
may have represented a strategy for maintaining distance 
from competing regional states in the 18th and early 19th 
centuries, it offered limited scope for doing so over time as 
the East India Company came to define the terms of sov-
ereignty in the borderland as territorial rather than based 
on control over subjects. In this way, negotiation with the 
state based on defining and/or subverting group identities, 
as the bat had demonstrated, became a losing proposition. 
By delimiting group identities as fixed and immutable, and 
redefining sovereignty as territorial, the colonial state en-
sured that bats would always remain bats, but that kings, 




1. ‘Lepcha’ is the Nepali term for the supposedly indigenous 
people of the Darjeeling area; as colonial administrators 
and missionaries observed, ‘Rong-pa’ or ‘people of the 
ravine’ was their own label. For example, see Kilgour 
(1897). 
2. See Kennedy (1996) for a nuanced discussion of the 
initial growth of hill stations as sanitaria in the hill areas 
of the three Presidencies in the early 19th century. The 
trend represented a response to concern for the excessive 
mortality especially of lower-level European civil and 
military personnel; this was an era when climatic rather 
than a germ-theory of disease directed public health 
efforts. Europeans in the Presidency towns who wanted 
to escape the plains and reproduce British social life away 
from the supposedly corrupting influences of Indian life 
eagerly supported the development of hill stations.
3. Following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, 
the language of the free market became a way for British 
administrators to claim that colonized people were able 
to enter contracts to exchange their labor of their own 
volition. This discourse was used to justify the massive 
export of indentured labor to the West Indies as well as 
legitimize other appropriations of labor, as for example, 
in Darjeeling (Banerjee 2010). For a greater elaboration 
of the role of colonial ethnography in defining indigenous 
identities in the eastern Himalaya, see Chapter Two of 
my dissertation (in progress), ‘States of Labor: Migrants, 
Markets and Sovereignty in the India-Nepal Borderland, 
1800-1930.’
4. The Sens of Vijaypur (present-day eastern Nepal) were 
linked though kinship ties to the Palpa Sen rulers who had 
consolidated rule over the Himalayan foothills and tarai 
from Palpa (north of present-day Gorakhpur) in the 16th 
century. The Sens were only able to expand into the eastern 
Morang through the invitation of powerful Kirat chiefs who 
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had been acting as king-makers for several generations and 
wanted to overthrow their nominal rulers in the mid-17th 
century (Pradhan 1991).
5. Some of the clients were likely to have been kidnapped. 
See The Dorjeeling Guide (1845).
6. From A. Campbell to J. P. Grant, Darjeeling, 1 March 
1850, No. 458, Foreign Department (Hereafter FD), 14 June 
1850. National Archives of India (Hereafter NAI).
7. See also, No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI. 
8. No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
9. Affairs of Nepaul, 74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, Boards 
Collections (Hereafter BC), India Office Library (Hereafter 
IOL).
10. The following depositions are all found in: Proceedings 
held by Lt. Coll. Lloyd, and A. Campbell Esqr, 14 Oct 1838, 
74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, BC, IOL. 
11. For Chtrajit’s (Chutup’s) role, see Moktan (2004: 247). 
12. That a number of people migrated from the Ilam region 
to Sikkim after the war is also corroborated by Nepali 
sources (Manandhar 1983). 
13. Foning, writing in the late 20th century, claims that 
the Limbus and Lepchas were once related tribes, the 
Limbus having settled to the west (in present-day eastern 
Nepal) and the Lepchas having settled towards the east 
(in present-day Sikkim). The people in the middle region 
around Ilam were mixed and could easily assimilate with 
either Lepchas or Limbus. He explains that the Ilam people 
used to be humorously labeled “Nembang-moo Rongs, 
meaning two-and-a-half Lepchas” because they were 
known as exceedingly “clever and quick-witted.” According 
to Foning, many of the Ilam Lepchas settled in and around 
Darjeeling and assisted the missionaries in their activities 
from the mid-19th century (1987: 131-132). 
14. Affairs of Sikkim & Darjeeling, 87212, F/4/1981, 1842-
43, BC, IOL. 
15. It is possible that this refers to Chebu Lama as he had 
remained in Sikkim’s favor during the Dewan’s assassination 
and subsequent Lepcha exodus, so he would have been 
one of the few high-ranking Lepchas in a position to collect 
revenue near Darjeeling prior to annexation. No. 72, FD, 10 
July 1839, NAI.
16. Proceedings relating to Sikkim and Darjeeling, 83500, 
F/4/1934, BC, IOL. 
17. Emphasis added. Nepaul and Catmandoo Residency, 
87211, F/4/1981, 1842-43, BC, IOL; Affairs of Nepaul, 
74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, BC, IOL. 
18. Proceedings relating to Sikkim and Darjeeling, 83500, 
F/4/1934, BC, IOL.
19. Affairs of Sikkim & Darjeeling, 87212, F/4/1981, 1842-
43, BC, IOL.
20. It is also interesting to note that the Jerung Kazi 
regarded the office of ‘Dewan,’ held by his uncle who was 
assassinated over 10 years before, as entirely divisible 
from the Sikkim government. This suggests that the office 
of Chief Revenue Minister or Diwan was fashioned to 
incorporate alternative sources of power into monarchical 
lineages, rather than created from within the lineage. See 
for example, Hamilton (1819); Regmi (1975).
21. Chebu Lama seemed to maintain a firm grip over the 
services of shifting agriculturalists who he allowed to settle 
on his land; in 1864 when Sir Ashley Eden attempted to 
stage a diplomatic journey from Darjeeling into Bhutan, 
his porters deserted at the Tista River, unwilling to cross 
into Bhutan. As no other laborers would carry for the 
expedition, Chebu Lama within three days returned with 
his own tenants to provide the service. Apparently the 
porters had good reason to desert—the snows proved 
much higher than anticipated, many suffered of frostbite, 
some attempted to go back and were flogged as a result, 
and ultimately four died from exposure to the cold (Rennie 
1866).
22. For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see 
Chapter Three of my dissertation (in progress), ‘States of 
Labor: Markets, Migrants and Sovereignty in the India-
Nepal Borderland, 1800 to 1930.’ The former Queen 
of Sikkim (from the mid-1960s until the 1970s when 
her husband was deposed), Hope (Cooke) Namgyal, 
has provided insight into the Sikkim court’s position on 
Darjeeling’s annexation. Namgyal argues that the Sikkim 
Raja was considered the owner of all the land and that 
others could only be granted rights to usufruct. Thus, the 
Raja of Sikkim still considered himself sovereign over the 
land grant of Darjeeling and considered the residents 
his subjects (Namgyal 2004). While this view of the king 
as owner of the land is a by-product of 19th-century 
colonialism, still it indicates the deeply entrenched view 
in Sikkim that claims to Darjeeling were not entirely 
superseded by the grant of 1835, by which the Company 
had procured the hill station from Sikkim.
23. Respecting the interruption of friendly relations with 
the Rajah of Sikkim, 369-560, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
24. Until the military campaign of 1850 Sikkim claimed him 
as a subject and even thereafter, some of his clients were 
taken into Nepal’s Morang by a soldier of the latter state. 
36-40, Political C. Consultation, FD, 6 August 1852, NAI; 
Pinn 1986.
25. No. 459, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI. 
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26. No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
27. No. 459, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
28. Nos 464-468, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
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